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BAR BRIEFS
Begin now by joining the national organization. It would be a very
fine compliment to the State of North Dakota, the first ioo% state bar
organization, if it could be said at this meeting that it had also the
largest percentage of its lawyers as members of the national associa-
tion.-A. M. Kvello, President.
REPRODUCTION COST AND ORIGINAL PRUDENT
INVESTMENT
With the permission of the editors of the Iowa Law Review, we
reprint the editorial on the above subject in the February issue of that
journal, to-wit:
The cost of reproduction theory and the original prudent investment
theory have furnished for many years the two leading plans upon which
evidence is collected and introduced bearing upon the valuation of public
utility property. The proponents of each urge that the element stressed by
their theory should be given controlling influence in public utility valua-
tion. During the many years of controversy on this point the respective
sides have passed through several changes in attitude. The cost of repro-
duction theory was early advocated by attorneys representing the public,
at a time when the cost of reproduction appeared to be far below the
supposed original expenditure. On the other side, the utilities were
urging that the amount of the original investment should be accepted
as the test determining fair value. (72 N. W. 713; 50 Pac. 633; 15 Mich.
L. Rev. 205; 18 Mich. L. Rev. 774.)
Later, as costs of construction and equipment began to advance,
the utility attorneys, in turn, urged that the cost of reproduction be
considered. (P. U. R. 1919A 448, 464.)
It is not strange, therefore, that courts and commissions gradually
came to give this method of ascertaining value much emphasis in arriving
at conclusions as to the proper rate base.
The United States Supreme Court gave an early, detailed con-
sideration to the question in the leading case of Smyth vs. Ames, 169
U. S. 466. There, in listing the elements to be considered in the deter-
mination of fair value, the court said, " . . . in order to ascertain that
value, the original cost of construction, the amount expended in perma-
nent improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock,
the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the
probable earning capacity of the property under the particular rates
prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses,
are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as is
just and right in each case." This statement did not make it altogether
clear, which theory the court had adopted or whether it had accepted any
particular theory at all. Subsequent cases, however, indicate that the
Supreme Court looked upon cost of reproduction as one of the con-
trolling factors to be considered in determining the rate base, (i74 U. S.
739; 212 U. S. 19; 212 U. S. i), but that it would not use that evidence
as the sole test when it would lead to an unfair result. (230 U. S. 352.)
But as is illustrated by the concurring individual opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis, (262 U. S. 276), favoring the original prudent invest-
ment theory, the decisions which emphasized cost of reproduction were
not invariably the unanimous opinion of the court. Though the argu-
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ments thus pressed in that opinion were very able and very persuasive,
the majority of the court concurred in the restatement of its former
position and later decisions show that cost of reproduction is still regarded
as a primary element in valuation cases. (262 U. S. 679; 272 U. S. 400.)
During the period of these decisions by the Supreme Court the
World War occurred and with it came great fluctuation of prices. The
experience of that period brought out, with extreme clarity, the un-
certainties and difficulties that arose in the application of the reproduc-
tion theory. The result was that many legal writers advocated the use
of the original prudent investment theory on the ground that it would
offer a more fixed and certain standard than did cost of reproduction,
and the Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the cost of reproduction
were highly criticized. (15 MichL. Rev. 205 ;92 Cent. L. J. 153; 31 Yale
L. J. 263; 9 A. B. A. J. 3 9 2; 3o W. Va. L. Quart. 70.)
The state courts and the commissions then began to manifest a
tendency to minimize the importance of reproduction cost and to give
greater weight to original cost, (125 N. E. 891 ; 177 N. W. 3o6; 20 A. L. R.
555; 75 1. C. C. 463), for when the amount of the original prudent invest-
ment was once found, it would give a rate base that was stable and one
that could be used repeatedly in every case regarding the same property,
without the necessity of going through another complete process of
valuation.
The Interstate Commerce Commission was no doubt influenced by
this original prudent investment movement, when only three months
after the decision in 272 U. S. 400 it advanced that theory in the case of
124 I. C. C. 3. In this case the commission rejected evidence of repro-
duction cost at current prices as proof of the fair value and by a six to
four vote it adopted the original prudent investment theory as the
means to determine the value of the railway property for the purpose
of computing the excess profit to be recovered by the government under
Section i5-a of the Transportation Act of 1920. This case directly
involved the St. Louis & O'Fallon Railway, which was merely a nine
mile coal carrying railway in Illinois. But in reality it was a test case,
which concerned all of the railway interests in the United States, for
the commission in its report had stated that the methods employed in
that case were those to be applied to all of the railroads in the United
States. The Transportation Act provided, however, that in determining
the value of the property for recapture purposes, the commission should
consider all the elements of value recognized by the law of the land
for rate-making purposes. So, when the case went to the Supreme
Court, there was presented the same question that had been passed on
several times before in rate cases. The United States Supreme Court
in the case of 279 U. S. 461 reached the conclusion which might have
been expected in view of the prior decisions. The Interstate Commerce
Commission was reversed because it had overemphasized the importance
of the amount of the original prudent investment, and Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds, delivering the majority opinion, said, "The elements of value
recognized by the law of the land for rate making purposes have been
pointed out many times by this court... Among them is the present
cost of construction or reproduction."
There are, as noted above, certain advantages offered by adherence
to the original prudent investment theory but that course is hardly con-
sistent with the i 4 th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. A valuation
based upon cost of reproduction does not seem to confer upon the
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utilities any property which is not theirs according to accepted constitu-
tional notions. Though such property is devoted to a public use, still
the current legal theory recognizes that it is subject to non-public owner-
ship and management and the owners of it would seem to be entitled to
the increased value as are the owners of other property. It is
the present value of the property, the property.as it is presently, and a
reasonable return thereon to which the owner seems to be entitled and
in which he is protected by the guaranties of the 14th Amendment.
(37 Harv. L. Rev. 173; 9 A. B. A. J. 534.)
A different view would seem to require a distinct change in con-
stitutional theory, or a drastic denial of traditionally recognized incidents
of ownership notwithstanding the Constitution.
Ed :-It is to be noted here that the U. S. Supreme Court has handed
down another decision, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 123, since the editor of the Iowa
Law Review wrote the foregoing. The Court again divided, Justices
Brandeis, Holmes and Stone dissenting.
PROXIMATE CAUSE-CAUSAL RELATION-CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The rather recent case of Mahoney vs. Beatman, 147 Atl. 762, is
worth the reading, if for no other reason than because of the fact that
the writer of the opinion, Chief Justice Wheeler of Connecticut, is mak-
ing a considerable contribution to the restatement of tort law by the
American Law Institute.
The facts in the case were: Defendant, while proceeding northerly,
drove his car across the center of the road and onto the left hand side,
so that plaintiff, who was driving rapidly in the opposite direction, was
forced off the concrete onto the shoulder of the road. Despite this
giving of ground, the defendant's car struck the hub of the left front
wheel of plaintiff's car. Plaintiff's chauffeur lost control of the car,
and it swerved and crashed into a tree and a stone fence. The findings-
defendant's car was on wrong side of road; speed of plaintiff's car
was unreasonable but did not contribute to collision, which was due
entirely to defendant's negligence; the speed did, however, materially
hamper plaintiff in controlling car after collision; actual repair bill was
nearly $6,000; since court was unable to find from evidence the amount
of damage caused at time of impact, plaintiff is entitled to "nominal
damages," assessed at $200.
HELD: (on appeal) Excessive speed and loss of control did not
defeat plaintiff, because defendant's violation of duty (driving on
wrong side of road) was a substantial factor in the total result.
Editorial discussion of this decision in the February Yale Law
Journal is very interesting and instructive. We quote: "Under the
theory of the trial court the plaintiff would have contributed to the
full loss, hence he should recover only for the damage done by the first
impact. Under the appellate court's theory, either the judge (or the
jury) could have found substantial causal relation between the total
loss and the original impact. Under the dissenting opinion the case
could have gone back to the trial court for determination of the relation
between the plaintiff's negligence and the total loss. Under the analysis
